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TAX COMMENT
partly on the ground that it feared the sections in the old act to be
invalid and partly on the ground that the depressed condition of the
real estate market made the rental value of the company's space, as
defined in the statutes, a figure not representative of the true state
of affairs,29 since the rental value of the company's space varied
inversely with the rents received from other tenants.30 The company
is no longer required to include in its gross income the rental value
of space occupied by it but its deduction for taxes, expenses, and
depreciation is. limited to a sum which bears the same ratio to the
total of taxes, expenses, and depreciation as the rental value of the
space not occupied by the company bears to the rental value of the
entire property.31 This provision appears to be more reasonable and
equitable than the former one which was purely arbitrary and bore
no real relation to the facts of each case.
JOHN F. MITCHELL.
THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME-UNIFORMITY UNDER
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAusE.-In a recent decision of the United
States Supreme 'Court 1 determining the validity of a tax measure,
the Court was confronted with the problem of whether it should be
guided by the nature of the tax imposed, or the name assigned to
the tax by the taxing statute. It appears that the state of Illinois
levied a tax on the net receipts of foreign corporations engaged in
fire, marine and inland navigation insurance business. The net re-
""The Board of Tax Appeals has held that this limitation or condition
upon the deduction is unconstitutional, and that the company may still deduct
the entire amount of depreciation, taxes and other expenses upon its whole
property notwithstanding there is included in its gross income rent from only a
part of the property. Without regard to the legality of the present provisions,
your committee believes that these provisions would operate somewhat severely
in present depressed condition of real estate, and that is more equitable merely
to allow so much of these deductions as pertain to the part of the property
which is occupied by the company than to allow such deductions in full upon
condition of including in gross income a more or less arbitrary determination
of rental value." RPoxT No. 665, Finance Comm., U. S. Senate, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 36 (1932).
" See Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co., supra note 25, in which
case the operation of the old statute resulted in the rental value of the tax-
payer's space being $14,784 in 1923 and $34,400 in 1924, although there had
been only small changes in the taxes, expenses, and depreciation and in the
book value of the building while rents from tenants showed a slight decline.
1 REGULATIONS 77, Art. 976 (1933) in explaining the operation of the
new section states: "For example, if the rental value of the space not occupied
by the company is equal to one-half of the rental value of the entire property,
the dedtiction for taxes, expenses and depreciation is one-half of the taxes,
expenses and depreciation on account of the entire property."
I Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S. 535, 54 Sup. Ct 830 (1934).
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ceipts of the corporation according to the statute was "subject to the
same rate of taxation for all purposes, State, County, Town and
Municipal that other personal property is subject at the place where
located." 2 Foreign casualty insurance corporations doing a casualty
business only, were exempt from the tax.3 Plaintiff in error, the
corporation, in addition to its fire, marine and inland navigation in-
surance business insured against casualties. From 1923-1926 the
corporation made returns of its net receipts from fire, marine and
inland navigation insurance, but the receipts were not scaled down
as was done in the assessment of other personal property. In 1927
the corporation made a return of its net receipts from fire, marine
and inland navigation insurance but failed to include in its returns re-
ceipts from casualty insurance. The corporation was cited to appear
before the Board of Review on a proposed re-assessment of its 1923-
1926 returns and also on a review of the assessment made by the
Board of Assessors as to the 1927 return. On appeal from the deci-
sion of the Board of Review taken to the Supreme Court of the State,
the assessments for the years 1923-1926 were held invalid, for the rea-
son that the net receipts were not scaled down as in the case of other
personal property. But the Court in its opinion upheld the assessment
as to the 1927 return, wherein the taxing authorities did not scale
down the net receipts as in the case of other personal property and
also increased the amount of the net receipts to cover the receipts
from casualty insurance.4  The corporation thereupon brought this
appeal and the United States Supreme Court held that a tax on the
net receipts of the business of a foreign fire insurance corporation
based on an assessment of their full value, when other personal
property in the state is assessed at less than its full value violates
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 and that
it is essentially of the same character of arbitrary discrimination that
was held invalid in Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding (Hanover
'ILL. LAWS (1869) §30, 209, 228; ILL. LAWS (1874) §30, 179; CAHILL'S
ILL. REV. STAT., c. 73, §159.
'Fidelity & C. Co. v. Board of Review, 264 Ill. 11, 105 N. E. 704 (1914).
"Illinois v. Concordia Ins. Co., 350 Ill. 365, 183 N. E. 241 (1932).
' From the second decision of the Illinois court in Hanover Fire Ins. Co.
v. Harding, 327 Ill. 590, 158 N. E. 849 (1927), the majority opinion in the
instant case, supra note 1, at 542, 54 Sup. Ct. at 832, quoted as follows:
"Section 30 provides: 'That net receipts shall be subject to the same rate of
taxation * * * that other personal property where located.' The use of the
word other indicates that the net receipts were to be considered as personal
property and treated the same as other personal property. Clearly, this pro-
vision means not only the percentage of the rate but the basis of the valuation
shall be the same. Taxing by uniform rules requires uniformity not only in
the rate of taxation but also uniformity in the mode of the assessment upon
the taxable valuation. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of
taxation, and this equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the
mode of assessment as well as in the rate percent of taxation." The earlier
decision of the Illinois Court, 317 Ill. 366, 148 N. E. 23 (1925) was revld in
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding (Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr), infra
note 6.
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Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr).6 The United States Supreme Court
further held that there was a denial of the equal protection of the
laws to foreign fire, marine and inland navigation insurance cor-
porations by the Supreme Court of the State in construing a statute
imposing a property tax on their net receipts as applicable to receipts
from casualty insurance business while foreign casualty insurance
corporations doing a casualty business only, in direct competition with
them were not subject to such tax or equivalent tax. In the majority
opinion it was said: 7
"This statement shows that Section 30 as the State con-
strues and applies it works a very real and prejudicial dis-
crimination. * * * There is no basis or reason for making a
distinction between them that has any pertinence to the im-
position of a property tax such as in question. The net re-
ceipts which are taxed are not different from those which are
not taxed, and both come from the same source. Such a dis-
crimination in respect of the taxation of real or tangible per-
sonal property obviously would be essentially arbitrary. In
principle, it is not different from the net receipts. They are
property and the tax which Section 30 imposes is, as the state
court holds, a property tax."
Justice Cardozo voiced his dissent as to the holding that the tax
upon the net receipts of premiums for casualty insurance is a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.8  The learned Justice declared
that the validity of a tax depends upon its nature and not upon the
name assigned.9
For many years in the state of Illinois property subject to an
ad valorem tax was to be assessed at 30% or later 60%o of its value
and no more. For a considerable length of time the Supreme Court
of that state held that the tax upon the net receipts was a tax upon
personal property or at least was to be assessed in the same manner,
that is by scaling down the values. This was the practice until 1921.
In that year and for a time afterwards, the state court held that the
tax did not come within this rule of debasement as an ad valorem
tax but was rather a tax upon a privilege.' 0 In 1926 the United
States Supreme Court held that the denial of the 30% debasement
'272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179 (1926).
"Supra note 1, at 549, 54 Sup. Ct. at 835.
' Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone joined in this opinion.
'Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, supra note 1, at 836; St. Louis
Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U. S. 346, 43 Sup. Ct. 125 (1922); Federal
Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385 (1923) ; Louisville Gas
& E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 48 Sup. Ct. 423 (1928) ; Educational Films
Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170 (1931).
2o Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr, .supra note 5. This is the earlier decision
of the Illinois Court in the case.
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to foreign corporations brought about an inequality so gross in com-
parison with the burdens of domestic corporations as to vitiate the
tax and the statute that imposed it." The Supreme Court of Illinois
following that decision changed the position it had taken in 1921 and
held there must be debasement of value similar to taxes upon per-
sonal property.12 Justice Cardozo said: 13
"No descriptive epithet applied to the tax by the Illi-
nois Court or any other can transform the essential nature of
the tax into something other than it is. * * * No descriptive
epithet can make a tax upon the net receipts of the business
of the whole year the same as one upon the property located
on a particular day of the year within the area of the taxing
district or the same as one upon the capital or income of in-
vestments. If the foreign corporations subjected to this tax
on net receipts had taken the gross receipts out of the State
at once after collection, or had placed them in an insolvent
bank with the result that nothing remained when the assess-
ment day arrived, the tax would have still been due without
the abatement of a dollar."
The tax in question, that is, one on net receipts of a business, is
generally called an excise tax.14 But regardless of what it is called,
it is a tax on net receipts.
Justice Cardozo states that the United States Supreme Court
did not hold in Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding (Hanover
Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr),1-5 that if the tax was an excise it would
be void even though the assessment were to be debased. All that was
held in the case was that calling it an excise tax would not save it if
the benefit of debasement was withheld in a discriminatory manner.
Therefore, calling it a property tax does not make it invalid if de-
basement is allowed. The Illinois Court did not decide, in retract-
ing the description of a tax upon a privilege, that a tax on property
is identical with a tax upon the net receipts of a business. "Things
so essentially different would not become the same even if a Court
were to confuse them and speak of them as one." 16 All that the
Illinois Court held was that the tax would be viewed as a property
tax and so subject to debasement.
The question in the instant case 17 still remains as to what 'kind
of classification is permissible when net receipts of business are the
subject matter of a tax.
'Supra note 6.
'Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, supra note 5. This is the second
decision of the Illinois Court in the case.T Stpra note 1, at 551, 54 Sup. Ct. at 836.
", Flint v. Stone, Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 108, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911).
Supra note 6.




The dissenting opinion declared the rule, which is well support-
ed by decisions of the court, that a tax upon the net receipts of one
form of business is not invalid merely because a like tax or an equal
one is not laid on the net receipts of every other kind of business. 18
If this were the case, the whole statute must fall and not only that
part which affects the casualty premiums:
"To say that a tax on net receipts of one kind of 'busi-
ness was void because a like tax is not laid on different forms
of business would mean that the net receipts of insurance
companies may not be taxed without laying a like tax on manu-
facturers and merchants." 19
It was further stated in the dissent that the assailant of the tax
must satisfy the courts that the classification had its creation in noth-
ing better than "whim and fantasy, a tyrannical exercise of arbitrary
power," before it would be declared invalid. 20
With these rulings before us, we are in a position to determine
logically whether in the instant case 21 the taxing statute was "whim-
sical and fantastic" in levying a tax upon all the net receipts of for-
eign fire insurance corporations, including those receipts derived from
casualty business, when no such tax is imposed upon insurance cor-
porations that do a casualty business only.
If this statute is "whimsical and fantastic," Justice Cardozo
states, it must be because the activities in one class overlap to some
degree the activities of the other class. There is no rule, he declares,
and correctly so, that overlapping classes can never be established
except at the expense of the violation of the Federal Constitution.22
If this were the case, it would mean that a department store's receipts
may not be taxed unless all the many activities thus brought under
the single roof are taxed in the same manner when separately con-
ducted. If this were so, it would be necessary to tax the receipts
of the business of the shoemaker, draper, carpet dealer and jeweler,
and by the same reasoning the owner of a retail market dealing in
meats, groceries and fruit would then escape, at least proportionately,
a tax upon its receipts, if the statute did not include the receipts of
"Bells Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup. Ct. 533 (1890);
Pacific Express Co. v. Siebert, 142 U. S. 339, 12 Sup. Ct. 251 (1892) ; Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 223, 17 Sup. Ct. 305 (1897); Southwestern
Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 30 Sup. Ct. 496 (1910) ; Oliver Iron Min. Co.
v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526 (1923) ; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S.
142, 45 Sup. Ct. 424 (1925) ; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 50 Sup.
Ct. 310 (1930); Union Bank & T. Co. v. Phelps, 288 U. S. 181, 53 Sup. Ct.
321 (1933).
' Suprz note 1, at 553, 54 Sup. Ct. at 837.
Id. at 554, 54 Sup. Ct. at 837.
Supra note 1.
C.f. State Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct.
540 (1931) ; Louis K. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.- S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 481 (1933).
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the owner of a store who derived a modest income from the sale of
peanuts and bananas. Consequently few taxes upon earnings would
pass so fine a sieve.
Statistical records disclose that only a small amount of casualty
insurance business was done by foreign fire insurance companies in
the State of Illinois.23 In that State, fire insurance companies al-
though organized in other states, had never been allowed to do a
general casualty business, 24 whereas, foreign casualty companies re-
ceived premiums of a greater amount when compared to the pre-
miums when received from casualty business of foreign fire insurance
companies.2 5  In the instant case 26 the corporation's principal busi-
ness was to provide insurance against fire. It also did a casualty
business to a limited extent and is in a class of its own with capacities
essentially different from those companies that are unable to provide
insurance against fire but who do insure against almost every other
conceivable loss.
A division of one business may be similar to a division of an-
other and yet the kindred divisions may be burdened with unequal
taxes.2 7 If any other principle were adopted justice Cardozo asserts
it would mean that if a tax were levied on the receipts of a drug
store selling medicines and the drug store had a lunch counter, the
receipts from the sale of edibles must be excluded from the reckoning
unless there were a like tax on the receipts of a restaurant. The result
of this would be:
"That the legislature in that view may no longer classify
the forms of business with an eye to a composite group of
uniformities and differences. There must be a segregation
of forms of business into their constituent activities which to
the extent that there is identity, must be taxed for any one
group as they are taxed for any other. Immunity from the
tax laws of unequal operation have never until now been
pressed to that extreme." 28
In Bells Gap R. Co. v. Pen.nsylvania,2 9 Justice Bradley deliver-
ing the opinion of the court said: 30
' 60th Annual Report, pt. I at 96-105.
'Act of March llth, 1869; Act of May -31st, 1879; Act of June 30th,
1885; Act of May 6th, 1905; Act of June llth, 1912; Act of June 30th, 1925.
' 60th Annual Ins. Report, pt. 3 at 77-92.
' Supra note 1.
Supra note 1, at 557, 54 Sup. Ct. at 839, the dissenting opinion stated:
"Coincidence of some of the parts is not enough unless the parts are so many
as to determine the identity of the whole."
Supra note 1, at 557, 54 Sup. Ct. at 839.
"'Supra note 18.
Bells Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 18, at 237.
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"The provision in the Fourteenth Amendment that no
State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, was not intended to ,prevent a State
from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and rea-
sonable ways. * * * It may impose different specific taxes
upon different trades and professions and may vary the rates
of excise upon various products; it may tax real estate and
personal property in a different manner. * * * All such regu-
lations and those of like character, so long as they proceed
within reasonable limits and general usage are within the dis-
cretion of the State Legislature. * * * We think we are safe
in saying that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended
to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation."
It is therefore submitted that the dissenting opinion is logically
correct and practical in operation for the following reasons:
1. The nature of the tax in question is one on the re-
ceipts of a business, and is not a tax on property, regardless
of the name assigned to it. A tax statute is not to be con-
demned because of the name. If a tax of the net receipts
of one form of business is invalid because a similar tax is not
levied on other kinds of business it would mean that the busi-
ness receipts of one form of business could not be taxed unless
a tax was imposed on every kind of business. Certainly, this
was not within the contemplation of the statute in question.
2. The tax levied against the casualty receipts of foreign
fire insurance companies in Illinois was reasonable, since their
casualty business formed only a small part of their operations.
Foreign fire insurance companies in that state were in a class
different from those companies that did a casualty business
only. If this tax measure is held invalid the ultimate result
would be that few businesses would escape taxation, although
justified in being exempted.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment does not compel a state
to adopt an "iron rule of taxation." There was no abuse of
discretion in the tax on receipts of casualty business done by
foreign fire insurance companies in Illinois, and the tax should
have been declared valid.
IRVING WEINSTEIN.
INCOME TAx-CONSOLIDATED CORPORATION'S LIABILITY FOR
TAx INCURRED BY CONSTITUENT CORPORATION.-The Oswego Falls
Pulp & Paper Company was a constituent corporation to a consolida-
tion of the taxpayer (Oswego Falls Corporation) with itself on
